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Fears that globalization necessarily hurts the environment are not well-founded.    A survey
reveals little statistical evidence, on average across countries, that openness to international trade
undermines national attempts at environmental regulation through a “race to the bottom” effect. 
If anything, favorable “gains from trade” effects dominate on average, for measures of air pollution
such as SO2 concentrations.   Perceptions that WTO panel rulings have interfered with the ability
of individual countries to pursue environmental goals are also poorly informed.  Recent rulings have
in fact confirmed that countries can enact environmental measures, even if they affect trade and even
if they concern others’ Processes and Production Methods (PPMs), provided the measures do not
discriminate among producer countries.
People care about both the environment and the economy.  As real incomes rise, their demand
for environmental quality rises.   This translates into environmental progress under the right
conditions -- democracy, effective regulation, and externalities that are largely confined within
national borders and are therefore amenable to national regulation.   Increasingly, however,
environmental problems spill across borders.   Global externalities include climate change and ozone
depletion.   Economic growth alone will not address such problems, in a system where each country
acts individually, due to the free rider problem.  Multilateral institutions are needed, and national
sovereignty is the obstacle, not the other way around. 
Jeffrey A. Frankel
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At the Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle in 
November 1999, some protestors wore turtle costumes while launching the first of the big 
anti-globalization demonstrations.   These demonstrators were concerned that 
international trade in shrimp was harming sea turtles by ensnaring them in nets.  They felt 
that a WTO panel had, in the name of free trade, negated the ability of the United States 
to protect the turtles, simultaneously undermining the international environment and 
national sovereignty.   
 
Subsequently, anti-globalization protests became common at meetings of multi-
national organizations.  Perhaps no aspect of globalization worries the critics more than 
its implications for the environment.   The concern is understandable.  It is widely (if not 
universally) accepted that the direct effects of globalization on the economy are positive, 
as measured by Gross Domestic Product.      Concerns rise more with regard to “non-
economic” effects of globalization.
1   Of these, some, such as labor rights, might be 
considered to be a subject properly of national sovereignty, with each nation bearing the 
responsibility of deciding to what extent it wishes to protect its own labor force, based on 
its own values, capabilities, and politics.  When we turn to influences on the environment, 
however, the case for countries sticking their noses into each other’s business is stronger.   
We all share a common planet.   
Pollution and other forms of environmental degradation are the classic instance of 
what economists call an externality.  This term means that individual people and firms, 
and sometimes even individual countries, lack the incentive to restrain their pollution, 
because under a market system the costs are borne primarily by others, rather than by 
themselves.  The phrase “tragedy of the commons” was originally coined in the context 
of a village’s shared pasture land, which would inevitably be over-grazed if each farmer 
were allowed free and unrestricted use.  It captures the idea that we will foul our shared 
air and water supplies and deplete our natural resources unless somehow we are 
individually faced with the costs of our actions. 
 
A central question for this chapter is whether globalization helps or hurts in 
achieving the best tradeoff between environmental and economic goals.   Do international 
trade and investment allow countries to achieve more economic growth for any given 
                                                 
1 The quotation marks are necessary around “non-economic,” because economists’ conceptual 
framework fully incorporates such objectives as environmental quality, even though pollution is 
an externality that is not measured by GDP.  For further reading on how economists think about 
the environment, see Hanley, Shogren, and White (1997) or Stavins (2000). 
   4
level of environmental quality?   Or do they undermine environmental quality for any 
given rate of economic growth?   Globalization is a complex trend, encompassing many 
forces and many effects.  It would be surprising if all of them were always unfavorable to 
the environment, or all of them favorable.  The highest priority should be to determine 
ways in which globalization can be successfully harnessed to promote protection of the 
environment, along with other shared objectives, as opposed to degradation of the 
environment.
 2   
 
One point to be emphasized here is that it is an illusion to think that 
environmental issues could be effectively addressed if each country were insulated 
against incursions into its national sovereignty at the hands of international trade or the 
WTO.  Increasingly, people living in one country want to protect the air, water, forests, 
and animals not just in their own countries, but also in other countries as well.  To do so 
international cooperation is required.   National sovereignty is the obstacle to such 
efforts, not the ally.  Multilateral institutions are a potential ally, not the obstacle. 
 
In the course of this chapter, we encounter three ways in which globalization can 
be a means of environmental improvement.   So the author hopes to convince the reader, 
at any rate.   Each has a component that is new. 
 
First is the exercise of consumer power.   There is the beginning of a worldwide 
trend toward labeling, codes of corporate conduct, and other ways that environmentally-
conscious consumers can use their purchasing power to give expression and weight to 
their wishes.   These tools would not exist without international trade.  American citizens 
would have little way to dissuade Mexican fishermen from using dolphin-unfriendly nets 
if Americans did not import tuna to begin with.    The attraction of labeling is that it suits 
a decentralized world, where we have both national sovereignty and consumer 
sovereignty.  Nevertheless, labeling cannot be a completely laissez faire affair.  For it to 
work, there need to be some rules or standards.  Otherwise, any producer could 
inaccurately label its product as environmentally pure, and any country could unfairly put 
a pejorative label on imports from rival producers.    This consideration leads to the 
second respect in which globalization can be a means of environmental improvement. 
 
International environmental issues require international cooperation, a system in 
which countries interact under a set of multilateral rules determined in multilateral 
negotiations and monitored by multilateral institutions.   This is just as true in the case of 
environmental objectives, which are increasingly cross-border, as of other objectives.   It 
is true that in the past, the economic objectives of international trade have been pursued 
more effectively by the GATT and other multilateral organizations than have 
environmental objectives.   But multilateral institutions can be made a means of 
environmental protection.   This will sound like pie-in-the-sky to the many who have 
been taken in by the mantra that recent WTO panel decisions have overruled legislative 
efforts to protect the environment.  But the WTO has actually moved importantly in the 
                                                 
2 The literature on trade and the environment is surveyed in Dean (1992, 2001) and Copeland and 
Taylor (2003b).    
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environmentalists’ direction in recent years.  The front lines of multilateral governance 
currently concern -- not illusory alternatives of an all-powerful WTO versus none at all -- 
but rather questions about how reasonably to balance both economic and environmental 
objectives.    One question under debate is whether countries are to be allowed to adopt 
laws that may be trade-restricting, but that have as their objective influencing other 
countries’ processes and production methods (PPMs), such as their fishermen’s use of 
nets.  While the issue is still controversial, the WTO has moved clearly in the direction of 
answering this question in the affirmative, that is, asserting in panel decisions countries’ 
ability to adopt such laws.  The only “catch” is that the measures cannot be unnecessarily 
unilateral or discriminatory.  The environmentalist community has almost entirely failed 
to notice this major favorable development, because of confusion over the latter 
qualification.   But not only is the qualification what a reasonable person would want, it is 
secondary to the primary issue of countries’ rights under the trading system to implement 
such laws.  By ignoring their victory on the main issue, environmentalists risk losing the 
opportunity to consolidate it.   Some players, particularly poor countries, would love to 
deny the precedent set in these panel decisions, and to return to a system where other 
countries cannot restrict trade in pursuit of PPMs. 
 
Third, countries can learn from others’ experiences.  There has recently 
accumulated statistical evidence on how globalization and growth tend to affect 
environmental objectives on average, even without multilateral institutions.   Looking for 
patterns in the data across countries in recent decades can help us answer some important 
questions.   Increased international trade turns out to have been beneficial for some 
environmental measures, such as SO2 pollution.  There is little evidence to support the 
contrary fear that international competition in practice works to lower environmental 
standards overall.  Rather, globalization can aid the process whereby economic growth 
enables people to demand higher environmental quality.  To be sure, effective 
government regulation is probably required if this demand is ever be translated into 
actual improvement; the environment cannot take care of itself.  But the statistical 
evidence says that high-income countries do indeed eventually tend to use some of their 
wealth to clean up the environment, on average, for measures such as SO2 pollution.    
For the increasingly important category of global environmental externalities, however, 
such as emission of greenhouse gases, regulation at the national level is not enough. 
 
These three new reasons to think that globalization can be beneficial for the 
environment – consumer power, multilateralism, and cross-country statistical evidence -- 
are very different in nature.   But in each case what is striking is how little the facts 
correspond to the suspicions of critics that turning back the clock on globalization would 
somehow allow them to achieve environmental goals.   The rise in globalization, with the 
attempts at international environmental accord and quasi-judicial oversight, is less a 
threat to the environment than an ally.   It is unfettered national sovereignty that poses the 
larger threat. 
 
This chapter will try to lay out the key conceptual points concerning the 
relationship of economic globalization and the environment, and to summarize the 
available empirical evidence, with an emphasis on what is new.   We begin by clarifying   6





  It is important to begin a consideration of these issues by making clear that both 
economic income and environmental quality are worthy objectives.  Individuals may 
disagree on the weight that should be placed on one objective or another.   But we should 
not let such disagreements lead to deadlocked political outcomes in which the economy 
and the environment are both worse off than necessary.   Can globalization  be made to 
improve the environment that comes with a given level of income in market-measured 
terms?    Many seem to believe that globalization necessarily makes things worse.  If 
Mexico grows rapidly, is an increase in pollution inevitable?   Is it likely, on average?  If 
that growth arises from globalization, rather than from domestic sources, does that make 
environmental damage more likely?  Less likely?   Are there policies that can 
simultaneously promote both economic growth and an improved environment?  These are 
the questions of interest. 
 
  Two objectives: GDP and the environment 
 
An extreme version of environmental activism would argue that we should turn 
back the clock on industrialization – that it is worth deliberately impoverishing ourselves 
--  if that is what it takes to save the environment.    If the human species still consisted of 
a few million hunter-gatherers, man-made pollution would be close to zero.   Thomas 
Malthus, writing in the early 19
th century, predicted that geometric growth in population 
and in the economy would eventually and inevitably run into the natural resource limits 
of the carrying capacity of the planet.
3   In the 1960s, the Club of Rome picked up where 
Malthus had left off, warning that environmental disaster was coming soon.   Some 
adherents to this school might favor the deliberate reversal of industrialization -- reducing 
market-measured income below current levels in order to save the environment.
4 
But environmental concerns have become more mainstream since the 1960s.   We 
have all had time to think about it.   Most people believe that both a clean environment 
and economic growth are desirable, that we can have a combination of both, and it is a 
matter of finding the best tradeoff.    Indeed, that is one possible interpretation of the 
popular phrase “sustainable development.” 
To evaluate the costs and benefits of globalization with regard to the environment, 
it is important to be precise conceptually, for example to make the distinction between 
effects on the environment that come via rapid economic growth and those that come for 
a given level of economic output. 
 
                                                 
3 Malthus was an economist.  A contemporary commentator reacted by calling economics the 
dismal science.  This description has stuck, long after ecology or environmental science broke off 
as independent fields of study, fields that in fact make economists look like sunny optimists by 
comparison. 
 
4 Meadows, et al (1972), and Daly (1993).    For a general survey of the issues, see Esty (2001).   7
  We have a single concept, GDP, that attempts to measure the aggregate value of 
goods and services that are sold in the marketplace, and that does a relatively good job of 
it.  Measurement of environmental quality is much less well advanced.   There are many 
different aspects of the environment that we care about, and it is hard to know how to 
combine them into a single overall measure.  It would be harder still to agree on how to 
combine such a measure with GDP to get a measure of overall welfare.    Proponents of 
so-called green GDP accounting have tried to do exactly that, but so far the enterprise is 
very incomplete.  For the time being, the best we can do is look at a variety of separate 
measures capturing various aspects of the environment. 
 
A classification of environmental objectives 
 
For the purpose of this chapter, it is useful to array different aspects of the 
environment according to the extent to which damage is localized around specific 
sources, as opposed to spilling out over a geographically more extensive area. 
 
The first category of environmental damage is pollution that is internal to the 
household or firm.   Perhaps 80 percent (by population) of world exposure to particulates 
is indoor pollution in poor countries -- smoke from indoor cooking fires -- which need 
not involve any externality.
5   There may be a role for dissemination of information 
regarding long-term health impacts that are not immediately evident.  Nevertheless, what 
households in such countries are primarily lacking is the economic resources to afford 
stoves that run on cleaner fuels.   Some health risks in industrial production are 
analogous.  Workers in every country voluntarily accept dangerous jobs, e.g., in mining 
and construction, because they pay better than other jobs that are available to someone 
with the same set of skills. 
Some other categories of environmental damage pose potential externalities, but 
could be internalized by assigning property rights.  If a company has clear title to a 
depletable natural resource such as an oil well, it has some incentive to keep some of the 
oil for the future, rather than pumping it all today.
6  The biggest problems arise when the 
legal system fails to enforce clear divisions of property rights.   Tropical forest land that 
anyone can enter to chop down trees will be rapidly over-logged.  Many poor countries 
lack the institutional and economic resources to enforce laws protecting such resources.  
Often corrupt arms of the government themselves collude in the plundering.  Another 
example is the dumping of waste.   If someone agreed to be paid to let his land be used as 
a waste disposal site, voluntarily and without hidden adverse effects, economics says that 
there would not necessarily be anything wrong with the arrangement.  Waste has to go 
somewhere.  But the situation would be different if the government of a poor 
                                                 
5 Chaudhuri and Pfaff (2002) cite Smith (1993, p.551).   
 
6  Even when property rights are not in doubt and there is no externality, a common 
environmental concern is that the welfare of future generations does not receive enough weight, 
because they are not here to represent themselves.  From the economists’ viewpoint, the question 
is whether the interest rate that enters firms’ decisions incorporates the correct discount rate.  
This topic is beyond the scope of this chapter, but Goulder and Stavins (2002) provide a concise 
survey.   8
undemocratic country were to agree to be paid to accept waste that then hurt the 
environment and health of residents who lacked the information or political clout to 
participate in the policy decision or to share in the benefits. 
A second category, national externalities, includes most kinds of air pollution 
and water pollution, the latter a particularly great health hazard in the third world.    The 
pollution is external to the individual firm or household, and often external to the state or 
province as well, but most of the damage is felt within the country in question.   
Intervention by the government is necessary to control such pollution.  There is no reason 
why each national government cannot undertake the necessary regulation on its own, 
though the adequacy of economic resources to pay the costs of the regulation is again an 
issue.    
A third category is international externalities.  Increasingly, as we will see, 
environmental problems cross national boundaries.  Acid rain is an example.   In these 
cases, some cooperation among countries is necessary.   The strongest examples are 
purely global externalities:  chemicals that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, 
greenhouse gases that lead to global climate change, and habitat destruction that impairs 
biological diversity.   Individual countries should not expect to be able to do much about 
global externalities on their own.  These distinctions will turn out to be important. 
 
  The relationship between economic production and the environment 
 
  Scholars often catalog three intermediating variables or channels of influence that 
can determine the aggregate economic impacts of trade or growth on the environment.    
 
•  First is the scale of economic activity: for physical reasons, more output means more 
pollution, other things equal.   But other things are usually not equal.    
 
•  Second is the composition of economic activity:   Trade and growth can shift the 
composition of output, for example, among the agricultural, manufacturing, and 
service sectors.   Because environmental damage per unit of output varies across these 
sectors, the aggregate can shift.  
 
•  Third are the techniques of economic activity:  Often the same commodity can be 
produced through a variety of different techniques, some cleaner than others.  Electric 
power, for example, can be generated by a very wide range of fuels and techniques.
7   
To the extent trade or growth involve the adoption of cleaner techniques, pollution 
per unit of GDP will fall. 
 
                                                 
7  The most important alternatives are:   
•  coal-fired plants (the dirtiest fuel, though there is a little scope for mitigating the damage, 
through low-sulphur coal, scrubbers, and perhaps someday new carbon-sequestration 
technologies);  
•  petroleum products (not quite as dirty);   
•  solar (very clean, but much more expensive); and  
•  hydro and nuclear (very clean with respect to pollution, but controversial on other 
environmental grounds).        9
The positive effects of international trade and investment on GDP have been 
fairly well-established by researchers, both theoretically and empirically.   The 
relationship between GDP and the environment is not quite as well understood, and is 
certainly less of a constant relationship.    The relationship is rarely monotonic: 
sometimes a country’s growth is first bad for the environment and later good.   The 
reason is the three conflicting forces that were just noted.  On the one hand, when GDP 
increases, the greater scale of production leads directly to more pollution and other 
environmental degradation.  On the other hand, there tend to be favorable shifts in the 
composition of output and in the techniques of production.  The question is whether the 
latter two effects can outweigh the first.  
 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
A look at data across countries or across time allows some rough generalization as 
to the usual outcome of these conflicting effects.  For some important environmental 
measures, a U-shaped relationship appears:  at relatively low levels of income per capita, 
growth leads to greater environmental damage, until it levels off at an intermediate level 
of income, after which further growth leads to improvements in the environment.   This 
empirical relationship is known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve.   The label is by 
analogy with the original Kuznets curve, which was a U-shaped relationship between 
average income and inequality.   The World Bank (1992) and Grossman and Krueger 
(1993, 1995) brought to public attention this statistical finding for a cross section of 
countries.
8    Grossman and Krueger (1995) estimated that SO2 pollution peaked when a 
country’s income was about $5,000-$6,000 per capita (in 1985 dollars).   
For countries where a long enough time series of data is available, there is also 
some evidence that the same U-shaped relationship can hold across time.   The air in 
London was far more polluted in the 1950s than it is today.  (The infamous “pea soup” 
fogs were from pollution.)  The same pattern has held in Tokyo, Los Angeles, and other 
cities.   A similar pattern holds typically with respect to deforestation in rich countries: 
the percentage of US land that was forested fell in the 18
th century and first half of the 
19
th century, but rose in the 20
th century.
9 
                                                 
8 Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995) found the Kuznets curve pattern for urban air pollution 
(SO2 and smoke) and several measures of water pollution.  Selden and Song (1994) found the 
pattern for SO2, suspended particulate matter (PM),  NOx, and carbon monoxide.  Shafik (1994) 
found evidence of the U shape for deforestation, suspended PM, and SO2, but not for water 
pollution and some other measures.  Among more recent studies, Hilton and Levinson (1998) find 
the U-shaped relationship for automotive lead emissions and Bradford, Schlieckert and Shore 
(2000) find some evidence of the environmental Kuznets curve for arsenic, COD, dissolved 
oxygen, lead and SO2, while obtaining more negative results in the cases of PM and some other 
measures of pollution.  Bimonte (2001) finds the relationship for the percentage of land that is 
protected area, within national territory.  Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson (2000) point out that 
the relationship is very sensitive with respect, for example, to functional form and updating of the 
data set.  The evidence is generally against the proposition that the curve turns down in the case 
of CO2 (e.g., Holtz-Eakin and Selden, 1995), as is discussed later. 
 
9 Cropper and Griffiths (1994) find little evidence across countries of an EKC for forest growth.  
But Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) find supportive evidence in the time series for India.   10
 
The idea behind the Environmental Kuznets curve is that growth is bad for air and 
water pollution at the initial stages of industrialization, but later on reduces pollution, as 
countries become rich enough to pay to clean up their environments.  The dominant 
theoretical explanation is that production technology makes some pollution inevitable, 
but that demand for environmental quality rises with income.   The standard rationale is 
thus that, at higher levels of income per capita, growth raises the public’s demand for 
environmental quality, which can translate into environmental regulation. Environmental 
regulation, if effective, then translates into a cleaner environment.  It operates largely 
through the techniques channel, encouraging or requiring the use of cleaner production 
techniques for given products, although regulation might also have a composition effect: 
raising the price of polluting goods and services relative to clean ones and thus 
encouraging consumers to buy more of the latter. 
10    
 
It would be inaccurate to portray the Environmental Kuznets Curve as 
demonstrating – or even claiming -- that if countries promote growth, the environment 
will eventually take care of itself.   Only if pollution is largely confined within the home 
or within the firm does that Panglossian view necessarily apply.
11  Most pollution, such 
as SO2, NOx, etc., is external to the home or firm.  For such externalities, higher income 
and a popular desire to clean up the environment are not enough.  There must also be 
effective government regulation, which usually requires a democratic system to translate 
the popular will into action (something that was missing in the Soviet Union, for 
example), as well as the rule of law and reasonably intelligent mechanisms of regulation.   
The empirical evidence confirms that the participation of well-functioning democratic 
governments is an important part of the process.    That is at the national level.  The 
requirements for dealing with cross-border externalities are greater still. 
 
Another possible explanation for the pattern of the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
is that it works naturally via the composition of output.   In theory, the pattern could 
result from the usual stages of economic development: the transition from an agrarian 
economy to manufacturing, and then from manufacturing to services.  Services tend to 
generate less pollution than heavy manufacturing.
12   This explanation is less likely than 
the conventional view to require the mechanism of effective government regulation.   If 
the Kuznets curve in practice resulted solely from this composition effect, however, then 
high incomes should lead to a better environment even when externalities arise at the 
                                                 
 
10 Theoretical derivations of the environmental Kuznets curve include Andreoni and Levinson 
(2001), Jaeger and Kolpin (2000), Selden and Song (1995) and Stokey (1998), among others.  
 
11 Chaudhuri and Pfaff (2002) find a U-shaped relationship between income and the generation of 
indoor smoke, across households.  In the poorest households, rising incomes mean more cooking 
and more indoor pollution.  Still-higher incomes allow a switch to cleaner fuels.  Individual 
familes make the switch on their own, as they gain the wherewithal to do so.  Government 
intervention is not required. 
 
12 Arrow, et al, (1995); Panayotou, (1993).      11
international level, which is not the case.  No Kuznets curve has yet appeared for carbon 
dioxide, for example.   Even though emissions per unit of GDP do tend to fall, this is not 




  It will help if we clarify one more fundamental set of issues before we turn to the 
main subject, the role of globalization per se. 
 
  It is logical to expect environmental regulation to cost something, to have a 
negative effect on measured productivity and income per capita.   “There is no free 
lunch,” Milton Friedman famously said.   Most tangible good things in life cost 
something, and for many kinds of regulation, if effective, people will readily agree that 
the cost is worth paying.  Cost-benefit tests and cost-minimization strategies are 
economists’ tools for trying to make sure that policies deliver the best environment for a 
given economic cost, or the lowest economic cost for a given environmental goal.   Taxes 
on energy, for example, particularly on hydrocarbon fuels, are quite an efficient mode of 
environmental regulation (if the revenue is “recycled” efficiently); while CAFE standards 
are somewhat less efficient (differentiated CAFE standards, for example, probably 
encouraged the birth of the SUV craze); and crude “command and control” methods are 
less efficient still (e.g., government mandates regarding what specific technologies firms 
must use).   Some environmental regulations, when legislated or implemented poorly, can 
impose very large and unnecessary economic costs on firms, and workers, and 
consumers. 
 
  Occasionally there are policy measures that have both environmental and 
economic benefits.  Usually these “win-win” ideas constitute the elimination of some 
previously existing distortion in public policy.  Many countries have historically 
subsidized the use of coal.  The United States subsidizes mining and cattle grazing on 
federal land, and sometimes logging and oil drilling as well, not to mention water use.  
Other countries have substantial subsidies for ocean fishing.  Elimination of such 
subsidies would improve the environment and save money at the same time -- not just for 
the federal budget, but for people’s real income in the aggregate as well.  Admittedly the 
economists’ approach – taxing gasoline or making ranchers pay for grazing rights – is 
often extremely unpopular politically. 
 
  Another idea that would have economic and environmental benefits 
simultaneously would be to remove all barriers against international trade in 
environmental equipment and services, such as those involved in renewable energy 
generation, smokestack scrubbing, or waste treatment facilities.  There would again be a 
double pay-off: the growth-enhancing effect of elimination barriers to exports (in a sector 
where the United States is likely to be able to develop a comparative advantage), together 
with the environment-enhancing effect of facilitating imports of the inputs that go into 
environmental protection.   A precedent is the removal of barriers to the imports of  fuel-
efficient cars from Japan, which was a clear case of simultaneously promoting free trade 
and clean air.   12
  
  A different school of thought claims that opportunities for saving money while 
simultaneously saving the environment are common rather than rare.   The Porter 
Hypothesis holds that a tightening of environmental regulation stimulates technological 
innovation and thereby has positive effects on both the economy and the environment -- 
for example, saving money by saving energy.
13  The analytical rationale for this view is 
not always made clear.   (Is the claim that a change in regulation, regardless in what 
direction, stimulates innovation, or is there something special about environmental 
regulation?  Is there something special about the energy sector?)  Its proponents cite a 
number of real-world examples where a new environmental initiative turned out to be 
profitable for a given firm or industry.   Such cases surely exist, but there is little reason 
to think that a link between regulation and productivity growth holds as a matter of 
generality.  The hypothesis is perhaps better understood as making a point regarding 
“first mover advantage.”   That is, if the world is in the future to be moving in a particular 
direction, such as toward more environmentally friendly energy sources, then a country 
that innovates new products and new technologies of this sort before others do will be in 
a position to sell the fruits to the latecomers.    
 
 
Effects of openness to trade 
   
The central topic of this chapter is the implications of trade for the environment.    
Some effects come via economic growth, and some come even for a given level of 
income.   In both cases, the effects can be either beneficial or detrimental.   Probably the 
strongest effects of trade are the first sort, via income.  Much like saving and investment, 
technological progress, and other sources of growth, openness tends to raise income.  As 
we have seen, higher income in turn has an effect on some environmental measures that 
is initially adverse but, according to the Environmental Kuznets Curve, eventually turns 
favorable. 
 
What about effects of trade that do not operate via economic growth?   They can 
be classified in three categories:  systemwide effects that are adverse, systemwide effects 
that are beneficial, and effects that vary across countries depending on local “comparative 
advantage.” 
 
  Race to the bottom 
 
The “race to the bottom” hypothesis is perhaps the strongest basis for fearing that 
international trade and investment specifically (rather than industrialization generally) 
will put downward pressure on countries’ environmental standards and thus damage the 
environment across the global system.     Leaders of industry, and of the unions whose 
members are employed in industry, are always concerned about competition from abroad.   
When domestic regulation raises their costs, they fear that they will lose competitiveness 
                                                 
13 Porter and van der Linde (1995). 
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against firms in other countries.   They warn of a loss of sales, employment, and 
investment to foreign competitors.
14   Thus domestic producers often sound the 
competitiveness alarm as a way of applying political pressure on their governments to 
minimize the burden of regulation.
15  
 
To some, the phrase “race to the bottom” connotes that the equilibrium will be a 
world of little or no regulation.  Others emphasize that, in practice, it is not necessarily a 
matter of globalization leading to environmental standards that literally decline over time, 
but rather retarding the gradual raising of environmental standards that would otherwise 
occur.   Either way, the concern is that, to the extent that countries are open to 
international trade and investment, environmental standards will be lower than they 
would otherwise be.   But how important is this in practice?  Some economists’ research 
suggests that environmental regulation is not one of the more important determinants of 
firms’ ability to compete internationally.   When deciding where to locate, multinational 
firms seem to pay more attention to such issues as labor costs and market access than to 
the stringency of local environmental regulation.
16 
 
Once again, it is important to distinguish (1) the fear that globalization will lead to 
a race to the bottom in regulatory standards, from (2) fears that the environment will be 
damaged by the very process of industrialization and economic growth itself.   Opening 
of national economies to international trade and investment could play a role in both 
cases, but the two possible channels are very different.  In the first case, the race to the 
bottom hypothesis, the claim is that openness undermines environmental standards even 
for a given path of economic growth.  This would be a damning conclusion from the 
standpoint of globalization, because it would imply that by limiting trade and investment 
in some way, we might be able to attain a better environment for any given level of GDP.  
In the second case, the implication would be that openness only affects the environment 
in the way that investment, or education, or productivity growth, or any other source of 
                                                 
14 Levinson and Taylor (2001) find that those US industries experiencing the largest rise in 
environmental control costs have indeed also experienced the largest increases in net imports. 
 
15 What is competitiveness?  Economists tend to argue that concerns regarding international 
competitiveness, if interpreted as fears of trade deficits, are misplaced, which would seem to 
imply they should not affect rational policy-making.  (Or else, to the extent competitiveness 
concerns can be interpreted as downward pressure on regulation commensurate with cost 
considerations, economists figure that they may be appropriate and efficient.)   But Esty and 
Gerardin (1998, p.17-21) point out that competitiveness fears, under actual political economy 
conditions, may inhibit environmental regulation even if they are not fully rational.  Ederington 
and Minier (2002) find econometrically that countries do indeed use environmental regulation to 
reduce trade flows -- that they tend to adopt less-stringent environmental regulations for their 
import-competing industries than for others. 
 
16 Jaffe, Peterson,  Portney and  Stavins (1995), Grossman and Krueger (1993), Low and Yeats 
(1992), and Tobey (1990).   Other empirical researchers, however, have found more of an effect 
of environmental regulation on direct investment decisions:  Lee and Roland-Holst (1997) and 
Smarzynska and Wei (2001).  Theoretical analyses include Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995, 
2001) and Liddle (2001).    14
growth affects the environment, by moving the economy along the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve.    Trying to restrict trade and investment would be a less attractive 
strategy in this case, because it would amount to deliberate self-impoverishment. 
 
Gains from trade 
 
While the possibility that exposure to international competition might have an 
adverse effect on environmental regulation is familiar, less widely recognized and more 
surprising is the possibility of effects in the beneficial direction, which we will call the 
gains from trade hypothesis.   Trade allows countries to attain more of what they want, 
which includes environmental goods in addition to market-measured output.    
 
How could openness have a positive effect on environmental quality, once we set 
aside the possibility of accelerating progress down the beneficial slope of the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve?   A first possibility concerns technological and 
managerial innovation.  Openness encourages ongoing innovation.
17  It then seems 
possible that openness could encourage innovation beneficial to environmental 
improvement as well as economic progress.   A second possibility is an international 
ratcheting up of environmental standards.
18 The largest political jurisdiction can set the 
pace for others.   Within the United States, it is called the “California effect:”  When the 
largest state sets high standards for auto pollution control equipment, for example, the 
end result may be similar standards in other states as well.   The United States can play 
the same role globally. 
 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are often the vehicle for these effects.  They 
tend to bring clean state-of-the-art production techniques from high-standard countries of 
origin, to host countries where they are not yet known, for several reasons:   
 
“First, many companies find that the efficiency of having a single set of 
management practices, pollution control technologies, and training programmes 
geared to a common set of standards outweighs any cost advantage that might be 
obtained by scaling back on environmental investments at overseas facilities.  
Second, multinational enterprises often operate on a large scale, and recognise 
that their visibility makes them especially attractive targets for local enforcement 
officials...Third, the prospect of liability for failing to meet standards often 
motivates better environmental performance...” -- Esty and Gentry (1997, p.161)   
 
                                                 
17 Trade speeds the absorption of frontier technologies and best-practice management.   This 
explains why countries that trade more appear to experience a sustained increase in growth rather 
than just the one-time increase in the level of real income predicted by classical trade theory.   
 
18  E.g., Vogel (1995), Braithwaite and Drahos (2000), Porter (1990, 1991) and Porter and van der 
Linde (1995).  This ratcheting up may be more effective for product standards than for standards 
regarding processes and production methods. 
   15
The claim is not that all multinational corporations apply the highest environmental 
standards when operating in other countries.  Rather the claim is that the standards tend 
on average to be higher than if the host country were undertaking the same activity on its 
own.
19   
 
Corporate codes of conduct, as under the U.N. Global Compact promoted by Kofi 
Annan, offer a new way that residents of some countries can pursue environmental goals 
in other countries.
20   Formal international cooperation among governments is another 
way that interdependence can lead to higher environmental standards rather than lower.
21 
 
Furthermore, because trade offers consumers the opportunity to consume goods of 
greater variety, it allows countries to attain higher levels of welfare (for any given level 
of domestically produced output), which, as before, will raise the demand for 
environmental quality.  Again, if the appropriate institutions are in place, this demand for 
higher environmental quality will translate into effective regulation and the desired 
reduction in pollution. 
 
Attempts to evaluate the overall effects of trade on the environment 
 
If a set of countries opens up to trade, is it on average likely to have a positive or 
negative effect on the environment (for a given level of income)?  Which tend in practice 
to dominate, the unfavorable “race to the bottom” effects or the favorable “gains from 
trade” effects?   Econometrics can help answer the question. 
  
Statistically, some measures of environmental quality are positively correlated 
with the level of trade.    Figure 1 shows a rough inverse correlation between countries’ 
openness to trade and their levels of SO2 pollution.    But the causality is complex, 
running in many directions simultaneously.   One would not want to claim that trade 
leads to a cleaner environment, if in reality they are both responding to some other third 
factor, such as economic growth or democracy.
22    
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Eiras and Schaeffer (2001, p. 4) find: “In countries with an open economy, the 
average environmental sustainability score is more than 30 percent higher than the scores 
of countries with moderately open economies, and almost twice as high as those of 
countries with closed economies.”  Does this mean that trade is good for the 
                                                 
19 Esty and Gentry (1997, pp.  157, 161, 163) and Schmidheiny (1992). 
 
20 Ruggie (2002). 
 
21 Neumayer (2002).  Multilateral environmental agreeements (MEAs) are discussed in a 
subsequent section. 
 
22 Barrett and Graddy (2000) is one of several studies to find that an increase in civil and political 
freedoms significantly reduces some measures of pollution.   16
environment?  Not necessarily.   It might be a result of the Porter hypothesis -- 
environmental regulation stimulates productivity -- together with the positive effect of 
income on trade.  Or it might be because democracy leads to higher levels of 
environmental regulation, and democracy is causally intertwined with income and trade.    
As noted, democracy raises the demand for environmental regulation.   Figure 1 suggests 
that the relationship between SO2 concentrations and openness remains clear even if one 
controls for the beneficial effect of democracy.  But there remain other possible third 
factors.    
 
A number of studies have sought to isolate the independent effect of openness.   
Lucas, et al. (1992), study the toxic intensity implied by the composition of 
manufacturing output in a sample of 80 countries, and find that a high degree of trade-
distorting policies increases pollution in rapidly growing countries.   Harbaugh, Levinson, 
and Wilson (2000) report in passing a beneficial effect of trade on the environment, after 
controlling for income.   Dean (2002) finds a detrimental direct of liberalization for a 
given level of income, via the terms of trade, though this is outweighed by a beneficial 
indirect effect via income.   
 
Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2001, 2003a) 
represent an extensive body of empirical research explicitly focused on the effects of 
trade on the environment.   They conclude that trade liberalization that raises the scale of 
economic activity by 1 per cent works to raise SO2 concentrations by ¼ to ½ % via the 
scale channel, but that the accompanying technique channel reduces concentrations by 1 
¼ to 1 ½%, so that the overall effect is beneficial.   But none of these studies makes 
allowance for the problem that trade may be the result of other factors rather than the 
cause.   Antweiler, et al, point out this potential weakness.
23  
  
Frankel and Rose (2003) attempt to disentangle the various causal relationships.  
The study focuses on exogenous variation in trade across countries, attributable to factors 
such as geographical location.   It finds effects on several measures of air pollution 
(particularly SO2 and NOx concentrations), for a given level of income, that are more 
good than bad.  This suggests that the “gains from trade” effects may be at least as 
powerful as the “race to the bottom” effect.  The findings are not as optimistic for other 
measures of environmental quality, however, particularly emissions of CO2. 
 
  Differential effects arising from comparative advantage 
  
So far we have only considered effects that could be expected to hold for the 
average country, to the extent that it is open to international trade and investment.  What 
if the environment improves in some open countries and worsens in others?  An oft-
                                                 
23  A few authors have sought to address some aspects of the problem of endogeneity.  Levinson 
(1999) shows that controlling for endogeneity of environmental regulation can change results, in 
his study of hazardous waste trade.  Dean (2002) treats income as endogenous in her study of the 
effect of trade liberalization on water pollution across Chinese provinces.  But the existing 
research does not directly address the problem that trade may be simultaneously determined with 
income and environmental outcomes.   17
expressed concern is that, to the extent that countries are open to international trade and 
investment, some will specialize in producing dirty products, and export them to other 
countries.   Such countries could be said to exploit a comparative advantage in pollution.  
The prediction is that the environment will be damaged more in this set of countries, as 
compared to what would happen without trade.   The environment will be cleaner in the 
second set of countries, those that specialize in clean production and instead import the 
dirty products from the other countries.   Leaving aside the possibility of a race to the 
bottom effect, the worldwide environment on average might even benefit somewhat, just 
as aggregate output should benefit, because of the gains from trade.  But not everyone 
would approve of such a bargain. 
 
  What determines whether a given country is expected to be in the set of 
economies specializing in clean or dirty environmental production?   There are several 
possible determinants of comparative advantage.    
 
  Endowments and comparative advantage 
First, trade patterns could be determined by endowments of capital and labor, as 
in the standard neoclassical theory of trade, attributed to Heckscher, Ohlin, and 
Samuelson.    Assume manufacturing is more polluting than alternative economic 
activities, such as services.  (If the alternative sector, say agriculture, is instead just as 
polluting as manufacturing, then trade has no overall implications for the environment.)    
Since manufacturing is capital intensive, the country with the high capital/labor ratio – 
say Japan – will specialize in the dirty manufactured goods, while countries with low 
capital/labor ratios – say China – will specialize in cleaner goods.  
 
For example, Grossman and Krueger predicted that NAFTA might reduce overall 
pollution in Mexico and raise it in the United States and Canada, because of the 
composition effect:  Mexico has a comparative advantage in agriculture and labor-
intensive manufacturing, which are relatively cleaner, versus the northern comparative 
advantage in more capital intensive sectors.   This composition effect runs in the opposite 
direction from the usual worry, that trade would turn Mexico into a pollution haven as a 
result of high demand for environmental quality in the United States.  That theory is 
discussed in the next section, below. 
  
Second, comparative advantage could be determined by endowments of natural 
resources.  A country with abundant hardwood forests will tend to export them if given 
the opportunity to do so.   Here there cannot be much doubt that trade is indeed likely to 
damage the environment of such countries.  True, in theory, if clear property rights can be 
allocated and enforced, someone will have the proper incentive to conserve these natural 
resources for the future.  In practice, it seldom works this way.   Poor miners and farmers 
cannot be kept out of large tracts of primitive forest.    And even if there were clear 
property rights over the natural resources, private firms would not have the correct 
incentives to constrain external side effects of logging and mining, such as air and water 
pollution, soil erosion, loss of species, and so on.   Government regulation is called for, 
but is often stymied by the problems of inadequate resources, at best, and corruption, at 
worst.   18
 
  Pollution havens 
  Third, comparative advantage could be deliberately created by differences in 
environmental regulation itself.   This is the pollution haven hypothesis.  The motivation 
for varying levels of regulation could be differences in demand for environmental quality, 
arising, for example, from differences in income per capita.  Or the motivation could be 
differences in the supply of environmental quality, arising, for example, from differences 
in population density.
  
   
Many object to an “eco dumping” system according to which economic 
integration results in some countries exporting pollution to others, even if the overall 
global level of pollution does not rise.
 24    They find distasteful the idea that the 
impersonal market system would deliberately allocate environmental damage to an 
“underdeveloped” country.   A Chief Economist of the World Bank once signed his name 
to an internal memo with economists’ language that read (in the summary sentence of its 
most inflammatory passage)  “Just between you and me, shouldn’t the World Bank be 
encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs?”  After the memo was 
leaked, public perceptions of the young Larry Summers were damaged for years. 
 
There is a little empirical evidence, but not much, to support the hypothesis that 
countries that have a particularly high demand for environmental quality –  the rich 
countries – currently specialize in products that can be produced cleanly, and let the poor 
countries produce and sell the products that require pollution.
25   For the specific case of 
SO2, the evidence appears to be, if anything, that trade leads to a reallocation of pollution 
from the poor country to the rich country, rather than the other way around.
26   This is 
consistent with the finding of Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) that trade has a 
significantly less favorable effect on SO2 emissions in rich countries than in poor 
countries.    Their explanation is that rich countries have higher capital/labor ratios, 
capital-intensive industries are more polluting, and this factor-based pollution-haven 
effect dominates the income-based pollution-haven effect.  
 
Does most US trade and FDI take place with low-standard countries? 
 
                                                 
24  The desire to “harmonize” environmental regulation across countries, and the arguments 
against it, are analyzed by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996). 
 
25 Suri and Chapman (1998) find that middle-income countries’ growth only leads to lower 
domestic pollution if they increase imports of manufactures.  Muradian, O’Connor and Martinez-
Alier (2001) find evidence that the imports of rich countries embody more air pollution than their 
exports.    Ederington, Levinson and Minier (2003) find that pollution abatement costs are 
relevant for only a small sub-set of trade: imports from developing countries in sectors that are 
especially mobile geographically. 
 
26 Frankel and Rose (2003).   We do not find significant evidence of other pollution-haven effects, 
based on population density or factor endowments, or for other pollutants.   19
To listen to some American discussion of globalization, one would think that the 
typical partner in U.S. trade and investment is a poor country with low environmental or 
labor standards.   If so, it would help explain the fear that opening to international trade 
and investment in general puts downward pressure on U.S. standards.  In fact, less than 
half of US trade and investment takes place with partners who have lower wages and 
lower incomes than we do.  Our most important partners have long been Canada, Japan, 
and the European Union  (though Mexico has now become important as well).   These 
trading partners sometimes regard the United States as the low-standard country. 
 
Does Economic Globalization Conflict with Environmental Regulation? 
 
  There is a popular sense that globalization is a powerful force undermining 
environmental regulation.   This can be the case in some circumstances.   The “race to the 
bottom” phenomenon can potentially put downward pressure on the regulatory standards 
of countries that compete internationally in trade and investment.  But, as an argument 
against globalization, it leaves much out. 
 
  First is the point that, for most of us, environmental quality is one goal, but not 
the only goal.  As already noted, we care also about income, and trade is one means of 
promoting economic growth.  The goals often need to be balanced against each other.  
 
Environmental concerns can be an excuse for protectionism.   If policymakers 
give in to protectionist arguments and erect trade barriers, we will enjoy less growth in 
trade and income. We will not even necessarily end up with a better environment.  
Import-competing corporations (or their workers), in sectors that may themselves not be 
particularly friendly to the environment, sometimes seek to erect or retain barriers to 
imports in the name of environmental protection, when in reality it is their own 
pocketbooks they are trying to protect.   In other words, environmentalism is an excuse 
for protectionism. 
 
Often, the problem is less sinister, but more complex.   To see how the political 
economy works, let us begin with the point that most policy debates are settled as the 
outcome of a complicated mix of multiple countervailing arguments and domestic 
interest groups on both sides.  Most of the major viewpoints are in some way represented 
“at the table” in the federal government decision-making process.   In the case of 
environmental measures, there are often adversely affected industry groups sitting across 
the table from the environmentalists, and they have an effect on the final political 
outcome.  But when the commodity in question happens to be produced by firms in 
foreign countries, then that point of view largely disappears from the table around which 
the decision is made.  If the issue is big enough, the State Department may weigh in to 
explain the potential costs facing foreign countries.   But, understandably, the foreigners 
receive less weight in the policy process than would the identical firms if they were 
American.  The result is that the environmental policies that are adopted on average can 
discriminate against foreign firms relative to domestic firms, without anyone ever 
deliberately having supported a measure out of protectionist intent.    
   20
One possible example is the strong opposition in Europe to Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs).   A Biosafety Agreement was negotiated in Montreal, January 29, 
2000, in which the US felt it had to agree to label grain shipments that might in part be 
bio-engineered, and to allow countries to block imports of GMOs.
27   In some ways, these 
negotiations might serve as a useful model for compromise in other areas.
28  But why 
have Europeans decided so definitively that they want to keep out genetically modified 
varieties of corn, despite the emergence of little or no scientific evidence against them as 
of yet, where American consumers are far less agitated?   Is it because Europeans are pre-
disposed to have higher standards for environmental issues?   Perhaps.
29   An important 
part of the explanation, however, is that Monsanto and other US technology companies, 
and US farmers, are the ones who developed the technology and produce the stuff, not 
European companies or European farmers.  Thus it is American producers, not 
Europeans, who stand to lose from the European squeamishness.  European agriculture 
need not consciously launch a campaign against GMOs.  All that the European movement 
needed was an absence around the table of producers who would be adversely affected by 
a ban.  But the result is to reduce trade, hurt American producers, and benefit European 
farmers. 
 
Whatever the source of different perceptions across countries, it is important to 
have a set of internationally agreed rules to govern trade, and if possible a mechanism for 
settling disputes that arise.   That is the role of the WTO.   The need for such an 
institution does not vanish when environmental issues are a part of the dispute.   Certainly 
if one cares at all about trade and growth, then one cannot automatically sign on to each 
and every campaign seeking to block trade on environmental grounds.   But even if one 
cares solely about the environment, claims need to be evaluated through some sort of 
neutral process.  One can be easily misled; corporations make dubious claims to 
environmental motivations in, for example, seeking federal support of “Clean Coal” 
research or ethanol production.   Most of the time, there is no substitute for investigating 
the details and merits of the case in question.  One should not presume that an interest 
group’s claims are right just because that group happens to be of one’s own nationality. 
 
The Impossible Trinity of global environmental regulation 
  
                                                 
27 The Economist, Feb. 5, 2000.    So far, the United States has been reluctant to bring the GMO 
case to the WTO, out of a fear of that the outcome might be a political failure even if a legal 
success.  As Victor and Runge (2002, 112-113) argue, the Europeans were sufficiently 
traumatized in the 1990s by a series of scandals in the regulation of their food, such as the UK 
government’s failure to stop “Mad Cow” disease, that an attempt by the US to use the WTO 
dispute settlement process to pry the European market open for GMOs would be 
counterproductive, regardless of the scientific evidence.  But the United States may go ahead 
anyway. 
 
28 Environmental NGOs were allowed inside the meeting hall, a new precedent.  FT, Feb. 1, 2000. 
 
29 But it is interesting that some health issues have gone the other way.   The US has in the past 
cared more about feared carcinogens than Europeans.  The US requires cheese to be pasteurized, 
and the EU does not.  (David Vogel, 1995.)   21
The concerns of anti-globalizers can be understood by means of a trilemma of 
regulation, called the principle of the Impossible Trinity of Global Governance.   In 
designing a system of global governance, three kinds of goals are desirable.   First, 
globalization is desirable, other things equal, for its economic benefits if nothing else.   
Second, regulation is desirable when it comes to externalities like pollution, or other 
social goals not adequately addressed by the marketplace.   Third, national sovereignty is 
desirable, because different countries have different needs or preferences, and also 
because nations take pride in their political independence.   The principle of the 
Impossible Trinity points out that it is feasible to design a system with any two of these 
attributes, but not with all three.    
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
  The three attributes are represented as the sides of the triangle in the 
accompanying figure.   The lower left corner represents a system of complete laissez 
faire.  The private market is given responsibility for everything.  With no government 
regulation, there is nothing to coordinate internationally, and thus no loss in national 
sovereignty.  If another country wants to make the mistake of heavy-handed intervention, 
that is its affair.   One can imagine Friederich von Hayek, Ayn Rand, or Milton Friedman 
favoring the laissez faire corner. 
  
The lower right corner represents a system of regulation at the global level.  
While there are not many “world federalists” around today, a proposal to establish a 
powerful World Environment Organization would be a step in this direction.    
 
The top corner represents isolationism.   Only if countries cut themselves off from 
trade, investment, and other international interactions, can they preserve complete 
national sovereignty, while practicing whatever kind of regulation they wish.   Two 
candidates in the year 2000 U.S. presidential election, Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan, 
seemed to want to move in this direction. 
  
The environmental concerns created by globalization can be understood in terms 
of this diagram.   The process of international economic integration is moving the United 
States and most other countries downward in the graph, toward the bottom side of the 
triangle.   As a result, globalization is creating a growing conflict between the needs of 
environmental regulation and the demands of national sovereignty, or so goes the theory.   
National sovereignty has been winning, which means that the movement has been toward 
the lower left corner.   The claim is that globalization has undermined the ability of 
sovereign governments to impose the level of environmental standards they would like. 
  
Although the impossible trinity can be a useful way to think about the potential 
for globalization to undercut national environmental regulation, it can be very misleading 
in some contexts.  There are two main reasons for this.   First, even for environmental 
externalities that are largely confined within countries, such as local air pollution, there is 
little empirical evidence that the “race to the bottom” hypothesis in fact holds, i.e., that 
international trade and investment in fact put significant downward pressure on   22
environmental regulation in the aggregate.  Indeed, international trade and activities of 
multinational corporations may sometimes put upward pressure on environmental 
standards.   Second, and more importantly, some environmental issues spill over across 
national borders even in the absence of international trade and investment, making it 
difficult for individual countries to address them through independent regulation. 
 
Environmental concerns cross national borders 
 
Even those who do not care about trade at all should appreciate the need for some 
international agreements and institutions.  The reason is the increasing importance of 
major sources of environmental damage that cross national borders, and that would do so 
even if there were no such thing as international trade.   Some externalities have long 
spilled over from each country to its neighbors -- such as SO2 pollution, which is 
responsible for acid rain, or water pollution, which flows downriver.  They can be 
addressed by negotiations between the two countries involved (e.g., U.S. and Canada).   
An increasing number of environmental externalities are truly global, however.   The best 
examples are greenhouse gases.  A ton of carbon dioxide creates the same global 
warming potential regardless where in the world it is emitted.   Other good examples of 
direct global externalities are stratospheric ozone depletion, depletion of ocean fish 
stocks, and threats to biodiversity. 
 
Even localized environmental damage, such as deforestation, is increasingly seen 
as a valid object of international concern.  A distinction is traditional between trade 
measures that target specific undesirable products, such as asbestos, and those that target 
Processes and Production Methods (PPMs), such as the use of prison labor in the 
manufacture of the commodity in question.  It is clear that a country concerned about its 
own health or environment has the right to tax or ban products that it regards as harmful, 
so long as it does not discriminate against foreign producers.  Indeed, such bans are less 
liable to become a vehicle for surreptitious protectionism, than are attempts to pass 
judgment on other countries’ production methods that are unrelated to the physical 
attributes of the product itself.   But is it legitimate for importing countries also to 
discriminate according to how a given product was produced?  Some ask what business is 
it of others whether the producing country wants to use its own prison labor, or cut down 
its own forests, or pollute its own environment?
30 
 
Often an international externality can be easily identified.  Forests absorb carbon 
dioxide (a process called sequestration, or creating carbon sinks), so logging contributes 
to global climate change.    An endangered species may contain a unique genetic element 
that someday could be useful to international scientists.  Desertification can lead to social 
instability and political conflict, which can in turn produce problems for international 
security.  Thus environmental damage in one country can have indirect effects on others. 
 
                                                 
30 See Charnovitz (2002a) on the history, law, and analysis of PPMs, and for other references.  He 
argues that the public failure to understand environment-friendly developments in the late 1990s 
within GATT/WTO jurisprudence regarding PPMs is now an obstacle to further progress (e.g., in 
the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment; p. 64, 103-04).   23
But foreign residents increasingly care about localized environmental damage as 
well, even when they live far away and even when there is no evident link to their 
interests.  The idea of “non-use value” is that many people place value on keeping, for 
example, a river canyon unspoiled, even if they know they will never see it.   While the 
methodology of estimating the value according to what people say they would pay 
(“contingent valuation”) is fraught with problems, the basic principle of non-use value is 
now widely accepted.  This means that citizens in one country may have a stake in 
whether another country dams up a gorge, kills its wildlife, or pollutes its air and water. 
 
 
Reversing globalization would not end the tension of regulation vs. 
sovereignty 
 
Thus, for an increasingly important set of environmental issues, the idea that 
individual countries could properly address the issues if left on their own is myth.   If 
countries do not cooperate through multilateral institutions, each will be tempted to free 
ride on the efforts of others, and little will get done.  Globalization and multilateral 
institutions are not the obstacle -- and the appeal of national sovereignty is not an ally -- 
in international efforts to protect the environment.  Rather, environmentalists need global 
agreements and global agencies if they are going to get other countries to do the things 
they want them to do.  It is the appeal of national sovereignty that is the obstacle. 
 
The mistake of blaming all ills on globalization and multilateral institutions such 
as the WTO has yielded some very strange bedfellows.  Environmentally concerned 
protestors have been treating labor unions and poor countries as comrades in arms, proud 
of the fact that a disparate set of groups have supposedly been brought together by a 
shared opposition to globalization.   But in fact, some of these groups are on the other 
side of the environmental issue.   U.S. labor unions are strong opponents of the Kyoto 
Protocol on Global Climate Change.   Poor countries tend to be strong opponents of  
international environmental agreements in general.  Both groups cite national sovereignty 
in support of their positions.  It is particularly puzzling that some environmentalists see 
pro-sovereignty supporters as natural allies, when so many environmental problems in 
fact need to be addressed by means of multilateral institutions that in fact infringe on 
national sovereignty. 
 
If labor unions and environmentalists can come together on an issue, that is fine.  
But they have to agree on that issue.  They should share something more than an 
emotional antipathy to some particular multilateral institution:   they should want the 
institution to move in the same direction, not opposite directions.  They don’t have to get 
into fine details, if they don’t want to.  But if, for example, one group thinks that the 
proper response to globalization is that the multilateral institutions should exercise less 
invasion of national sovereignty in the pursuit of environmental regulation and the other 
thinks the institutions should exercise more invasion of national sovereignty in that 
pursuit, then they are in truth hardly allies. 
 
   24
International agreements and institutions 
 
  Environmentalists are keen to interject themselves into the WTO.  Those who live 
in the world of international trade negotiations tell those who live in the environmentalist 
world that their concerns may be valid, but that they should address them outside the 
WTO, in their own, separate, negotiations, and their own multilateral agencies.
31     
 
  Multilateral environmental organizations 
 
The one multilateral organization dedicated to environmental issues in general, 
the United Nations Environmental Program, is universally considered small and weak, 
even by the standards of UN agencies.   Some may favor beefing it up.  Most feel that it 
is not fixable, that – to begin with – it would have to be based somewhere like Geneva in 
order to be taken seriously, not in Nairobi as now.  On these grounds, some have 
proposed a new, powerful, multilateral World Environment Organization.
32  Daniel Esty 
(1994) has proposed that it be called the Global Environmental Organization, providing 
the appropriate acronym GEO.   But the source of the problem is not some accident of 
bureaucratic design history or geography.  The problem, rather, is that there is very little 
support among the world’s governments for a powerful multilateral agency in the area of 
the environment.   They fear infringement on their sovereignty. 
 
  One can say that in concentrating their fire on the WTO, environmental activists 
are adopting a strategy of taking the multilateral trading system hostage. They envy the 
relative success of the WTO system.  They are aware that international environmental 
treaties, even if successfully negotiated and ratified, may be toothless.   The agreements 
made at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 are an example.   The activists would ideally like to adopt 
trade sanctions as a means of enforcement, as does the WTO itself.   
 
Such proposals do not explain attempts to take globalization hostage more 
broadly, for example by demonstrations at WTO ministerial meetings.  There is nothing 
in the WTO to block multilateral environmental treaties from adopting trade sanctions.   
Indeed, the Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone depletion has such sanctions, ran 
into no problems under international trade rules, and is generally considered to have been 
successful in achieving its goals.  Admittedly that is a rare example.   Most governments 
do not favor international environmental agreements that are so aggressive as to include 
trade sanctions.   Again, the failure does not mean that globalization and global 
institutions like the WTO are the problem.  More likely it is the other way around:  
globalization is the ally, and national sovereignty is the obstacle. 
 
Bilateral and regional FTAs 
  
                                                 
31 The most prominent and articulate spokesman of the viewpoint opposing linkage between trade 
and unrelated issues is Jagdish Bhagwati (2000).   
 
32 Charnovitz (2002b) surveys the proposals.   Juma (2000) argues in opposition, on the grounds 
that decentralized agreements can do the job better.   25
Regional and bilateral agreements, such as the European Union or the Australia-
New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship, have incorporated environmental 
components more often than have multilateral agreements.   Whether because of cultural 
homogeneity or the small numbers involved, a group consisting of a few neighbors is 
usually readier to contemplate the sort of “deep integration” required for harmonization 
of environmental standards than are negotiators in groups with more than 100 diverse 
members, such as the WTO.   
 
  In the public debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement, one of the 
most prominent concerns of opponents was the pollution that had already accompanied 
industrialization in northern Mexico, particularly among the maquilladoras along the 
border, which in turn was a result of the ability to trade with the United States.  The final 
agreement departed from previous U.S. trade agreements, or those in most other parts of 
the world, by taking into account environmental concerns, at least in a small way.  The 
preamble includes environmentally friendly language, such as a stipulation that the 
NAFTA goals  are to be pursued “in a manner consistent with environmental protection 
and conservation.”   Chapter 7B allows the member countries to continue adopting 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards.  Chapter 9 allows countries to set whatever 




Nevertheless, environmental groups were unhappy with the subsequent outcome.  
Proposed side-agreements, for example, to establish a bank to finance environmental 
clean-up along the border, received a lot of attention during Bill Clinton’s presidential 
campaign and during the subsequent NAFTA ratification campaign.  Follow-up after the 
NAFTA went into effect in 1994, however, was disappointing.  
 
Meanwhile, provisions under Chapter 11, which governs direct investment, have 
turned out to be important.   On the one hand, the text reads “the Parties recognize that it 
is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or 
environmental measures.”   On the other hand, protection of the rights of investors has 
confirmed some environmentalists’ fears, particularly a case brought by a Canadian 
company called Metalclad under the dispute settlement mechanism.  Under a clause that 
forbids a signatory from taking measures “tantamount to nationalization or expropriation” 
of firms from other member countries, Metalclad in August 2000 won a judgment from a 
NAFTA tribunal against local Mexican regulators’ attempt to close its hazardous waste 
disposal plant without compensation.   The finding that Mexican regulation had denied a 
foreign firm fair and equitable treatment was potentially an important precedent under the 
NAFTA.
34  But it would be strange, even from a pro-business viewpoint, if an American 
or Canadian firm were extensively protected against regulatory “takings” in Mexico 
when it would not be in its country of origin.    
 
                                                 
33 Hufbauer, Esty, Orejas, Rubio, and Schott (2000). 
 
34 Ibid. pp. 8-14. 
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  The NAFTA experience reinforced environmentalists’ concerns with trade 
agreements.  They urged the US government to bring environmental issues inside trade 
negotiations, for example, forbidding parties in trade agreements from relaxing 
environmental regulation in order to seek competitive advantage.  A preferential trading 
arrangement negotiated by the United States at the end of the Clinton Administration, the 
Jordan-US free trade agreement, incorporated such environmental provisions directly in 
the text, rather than as a side agreement, a precedent that was hoped to establish a 
“template” or precedent for future agreements.    In addition, an Executive Order now 
requires that the government prepare an “environmental impact statement” whenever 
negotiating new trade agreements in the future, to guard against possible inadvertent side-
effects adverse to the environment.
35 
 
  The failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
  
The first time that NGOs using internet-age methods successfully mobilized to 
block a major multilateral economic agreement was not in Seattle in 1999, but rather the 
preceding campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).   Efforts to 
agree on rules governing cross-border investment tend to founder as soon as the circle of 
countries is broadened beyond a small regional grouping.   The MAI was an attempt to 
negotiate such rules among the industrialized countries, at the OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development).   Notwithstanding the weakness of the 
negotiated text and the seeming obscurity of the issue, environmentalist and other NGOs 
were energized by claims that the MAI would handcuff countries’ regulatory efforts, and 
the MAI was not ratified.    
 
The WTO and some panel cases 
  
In the post war period, the vehicle for conducting the multilateral negotiations that 
succeeded in bringing down trade barriers in many countries was the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade.   An important outcome of the Uruguay Round of negotiations was 
the replacement of the GATT organization with a real agency, the World Trade 
Organization, which came into existence in 1995.   One reason why the change was 
important is that the new institution featured a dispute settlement mechanism, whose 
findings were to be binding on the member countries.   Previously, a party that did not 
like the ruling of a GATT panel could reject it.    
  Why do so many environmentalists apparently feel that the still-young WTO is a 
hostile power?   Allegations concern lack of democratic accountability and negative 
effects on the environment. It is difficult to see how these allegations could apply to the 
process of setting WTO rules themselves.   Regarding the alleged lack of democracy, the 
GATT and WTO are in principle one-country one-vote bodies that make decisions by 
consensus.  Clearly in practice, some countries -- particularly the United States -- matter 
far more than others.  But consider what it would mean to make this process more 
democratic.  It would presumably mean giving less weight to US views and more to the 
                                                 
35 The Executive Order was issued by President Clinton in 1999.  But President George Bush 
announced he would continue to abide by it, e.g., in preparing possible free-trade agreements with 
Singapore, Chile, and the Americas.   Martin Crutsinger, AP 4/21/2001 [e.g., Boston Globe].   27
views, for example, of India, the world’s most populous democracy.  But, given India’s 
preferences and its aversion to “eco-imperialism,” this would indisputably mean giving 
less attention in the WTO to environmental goals, not more. 
The allegation that the GATT and WTO are hostile to environmental measures 
could conceivably arise from the core provisions of the GATT, which prohibit a member 
country from discriminating against the exports of another, in favor of “like products” 
made either by a third country (that is the Most Favored Nation provision of Article I) or 
by domestic producers (the national treatment provision of Article III).   But Article XX 
allows for exceptions to the non-discrimination principle for environmental reasons 
(among others), provided that the measures in question are not “a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.”   
(Umbrella clauses allow countries to take actions to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, and to conserve exhaustible natural resources.)   
Under the GATT, there was ambiguity of interpretation as to what was to happen 
when Article XX conflicted with the non-discrimination article.  To clarify the matter, in 
the preamble of the articles agreed at Marrakech establishing the WTO, language was 
added specifying that its objectives were not limited to promoting trade but included also 
optimal use of the world’s resources, sustainable development, and environmental 
protection. Environmental objectives are also recognized specifically in the WTO 
agreements dealing with product standards, food safety, intellectual property protection, 
etc. 
The protests are in a sense a puzzle.  It would be easy to understand a political 
campaign in favor of the WTO taking a more aggressive pro-environment stance.   But 
how does one explain the common view in the protest movement that the WTO currently 
is actively harmful to the environment? 
When members of the protest movement identify specifics, they usually mention 
the rulings of WTO panels under the dispute settlement mechanism.  The panels are 
quasi-judicial tribunals, whose job is to rule in disputes whether parties are abiding by the 
rules that they have already agreed to.     Like most judicial proceedings, the panels 
themselves are not intended to be democratic.   The rulings to date do not show a pattern 
of having been dominated by any particular country or interest group.   There have been 
three or four fairly prominent WTO panel rulings that concern the environment in some 
way.  Most within the environmentalist and NGO community have at some point 
acquired the belief that these rulings told the United States, or other defendant country, 
that their attempts to protect the environment must be repealed.   The mystery is why this 
impression is so widespread, because it has little basis in fact.   
The four WTO cases that will be briefly reviewed here are Canadian asbestos, 
Venezuelan reformulated gasoline, U.S. hormone-fed beef, and Asian shrimp and turtles.   
We will also touch on the Mexican tuna-dolphin case. Each of the cases involves an 
environmental measure that the producer plaintiff alleged to have trade-distorting effects.   
The complaints were not based, however, on the allegation that the goal of the measure 
was not valid, or that protectionism was the original motivation of the measure.  In most 
of the cases, the allegation was that discrimination against foreigners was an incidental, 
and unnecessary, feature of the environmental measure. 
 
Canadian asbestos   28
One case is considered a clear win for the environmentalists.  The WTO Appellate 
Body in 2001 upheld a French ban on asbestos products, against a challenge by Canada, 
who had been exporting to France.  This ruling made real the WTO claim that its charter 
gives priority to health, safety and environmental requirements, in that for such purposes 




Venezuelan reformulated gasoline 
In the reformulated gasoline case, Venezuela successfully claimed that US law 
violated national treatment, i.e., discriminated in favor of domestic producers (with 
regard to whether refineries were allowed to use individual composition baselines when 
measuring pollution reduction).  The case was unusual in that the intent to discriminate 
had at the time of passage been made explicit by U.S. administration officials seeking to 
please a domestic interest group.  If the WTO had ruled in the US favor, it would have 
been saying that it was fine for a country to discriminate needlessly and explicitly against 
foreign producers so long as the law came under an environmental label.    Those who 
oppose this panel decision provide ready-made ammunition for the viewpoint that 
environmental activism is a false disguise worn by protectionist interests.    
The United States was not blocked in implementing its targets, under the Clean 
Air Act, as commonly charged.  Rather, the offending regulation was easily changed so 
as to be nondiscriminatory and thus to be permissible under the rules agreed by members 
of the WTO.  This case sent precisely the right message to the world’s governments, that 
environmental measures should not and need not discriminate against foreign producers. 
  
Hormone-fed beef 
What happens if the commodity in question is produced entirely, or almost 
entirely, by foreign producers, so that it cannot be conclusively demonstrated whether a 
ban, or other penalty, is or is not discriminatory? The WTO has attempted to maintain the 
rule that such measures are fine so long as a scientific study has supported the claimed 
environmental or health benefits of the measure.  In the hormone-fed beef case, the WTO 
ruled against an EU ban on beef raised with growth hormones because the EU 
conspicuously failed to produce a science-based risk assessment showing that it might be 
dangerous.    It thus resembles the case of the EU moratorium on GMOs.    
These are genuinely difficult cases.   On the one hand, where popular beliefs 
regarding a scientific question vary widely, a useful role for a multilateral institution 
could be to rule on the scientific merits.  Or, at least, a useful role could be, as under the 
current WTO procedures, to rule on whether the country seeking to impose the regulation 
has carried out internally a reasonable study of the scientific merits.   This logic suggests 
overruling the EU bans.  On the other hand, the world may not be ready for even this 
mild level of loss of national sovereignty.  If a nation’s intent is to protect its health or 
environment, even if the measure has little scientific basis and even if its primary burden 
would fall on foreign producers, perhaps ensuring that the ban does not unnecessarily 
discriminate among producing countries is the best that can be done.      
Despite the WTO ruling on hormone-fed beef, the Europeans did not cancel the 
ban. Their strategy, which they justify with the name “precautionary principle,” is to 
                                                 
36 New York Times, July 25, 2000.   29
continue to study the matter before allowing the product in.  The precautionary principle, 
as the Europeans apply it, says to prohibit new technologies that have not yet been proven 
safe, even if there is no evidence that they are dangerous.
37     A compromise would be to 
allow imports of American beef subject to labeling requirements, as in the Montreal 
agreement on GMOs, thus letting the consumer decide. 
 
Shrimp-turtle 
Perceptions regarding the WTO panel ruling on a dispute about shrimp imports 
and the protection of sea turtles probably vary more widely than on any other case.   The 
perception among many environmentalists is that the panel ruling struck down a U.S. law 
to protect sea turtles that are caught in the nets of shrimp fishermen in the Indian Ocean.   
(The provision was pursuant to the U.S. Endangered Species Act.)    In reality, the 
dispute resembled the gasoline case in the respect that the ban on imports from countries 
without adequate regulatory regimes in place was unnecessarily selective and restrictive.   
The WTO panel and appellate body decided that the US application of the law, in a 
complex variety of ways, was arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminatory against the four 
plaintiff countries (Asian shrimp suppliers).  The US had unilaterally and inflexibly 
banned shrimp imports from countries that did not have in place for all production a 
specific turtle-protection regime of its own liking, one that mandated Turtle Excluder 
Devices.
38  
The case could in fact be considered a victory for the environmentalists, in that 
the WTO panel and the appeals body in 1998 explicitly stated that the US could pursue 
the protection of endangered sea turtles against foreign fishermen. The United States 
subsequently allowed more flexibility in its regulation, and made good-faith efforts to 
negotiate an agreement with the Asian producers, which it could have done in the first 
place.  The WTO panel and appellate body in 2001 found the new US regime to be 
WTO-compliant.
39   The case set a precedent in clarifying support for the principle that 
the WTO rules allow countries to pass judgment on other countries’  Processes and 
                                                 
37   Does the precautionary principle derive from risk aversion?  Someone should point out that 
risk-aversion in the presence of uncertainty is not necessarily sufficient to justify it.   For poor 
residents of developing countries, the risk may be higher from drought or pests or disease in their 
crops, or from existing pesticides, than from the new GMOs that are designed to combat them 
more safely.  Does the precautionary principle say that society should persist with what is natural 
and traditional, even if the current state of scientific evidence suggests a better, artificial, 
substitute?   Then Asian men concerned about maintaining virility should continue to buy 
powdered rhino horn rather than switching to Viagra. (Gollier, 2001, offers another economist’s 
perspective on the precautionary principle.) 
 
38  For example, the Asian suppliers had been given only four months’ notice, thus discriminating 
against them and in favor of Caribbean suppliers.   
 [The US measure has also been pronounced 
unnecessarily restrictive in another sense: the majority of suppliers in India raise shrimp by 
aquaculture, where no sea turtles are endangered. Jagdish Bhagwati, Financial Times, December 
21, 1999.]  
 
39 Charnovitz (2002a, p. 98-99). 
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Production Methods, even if it means using trade controls to do so, provided only that the 
measures are not unnecessarily discriminatory.
40  
 
 Tuna-dolphin  
In an earlier attempt to protect another large flippered sea animal, the United 
States (under the Marine Mammal Protection Act)] had banned imports of tuna from 
countries that allowed the fishermen to use nets that also caught dolphins.   Mexico 
brought a case before the GATT, as this pre-dated the WTO, and the GATT panel ruled 
against the U.S. law.  Its report was never adopted.  The parties instead in effect worked 
out their differences bilaterally, “out of court.”  The case could be considered a setback 
for trade-sensitive environmental measures, at least unilateral ones,  but a setback that 
was to prove temporary.
   That the GATT ruling in the tuna case did not affirm the right 
of the US to use trade bans to protect the dolphins shows how much the environmentalist 
cause has progressed under the WTO, in the subsequent gasoline, shrimp-turtle, and 
asbestos cases. 
A system for labeling tuna in the US market as either “dolphin safe” or not was 
later found consistent with the GATT.   The American consumer response turned out to 
be sufficiently great to accomplish the desired purpose.   Since 1990, the major 
companies have sold only the dolphin-safe kind of tuna.  The moral is not just that the 
goal of protecting the dolphins was accomplished despite globalization in its GATT 
incarnation.   The moral is, rather, that globalization was instrumental in the protection of 
the dolphins.  The goal could not have been accomplished without international trade, 
because American citizens would have had no effective way of putting pressure on 




Multilateral environmental agreements 
  
When it comes to global externalities such as endangered species, stratospheric 
ozone depletion, and global climate change, it is particularly clear that the problem 
                                                 
40  For a full explanation of the legal issues, see Charnovitz (2002a).   Also Michael Weinstein, 
“Greens and Globalization: Declaring Defeat in the Face of Victory,” NY Times, April 22, 2001.  
Charnovitz and Weinstein (2001) argue that the environmentalists fail to realize the progress they 
have made in recent WTO panel cases, and may thereby miss an opportunity to consolidate those 
gains.   It is not only environmentalists who are under the impression that the GATT rules do not 
allow PPMs.  Some developing countries also claim that PPMs violate the GATT.  The motive of 
the first group is to fight the GATT, while the motive of the second group is to fight PPMs. 
 
41 Thomas Friedman, New York Times, p. A31, December 8, 1999.  Presumably, in the absence of 
the opportunity to export to the US, Mexican fisherman would not have caught as many tuna for 
the domestic market alone, which would have limited the dolphin casualties somewhat.  It is not 
known whether the much-reduced number of dolphins still killed under the current system is less 
than in the hypothetical no-trade case. But working through the channel of voting power 
represented by U.S. imports was surely a better way to have accomplished the goal.  Telling 
Mexican fisherman they must remain poor, and telling American consumers that they couldn’t eat 
tuna, would have been a less satisfactory solution to the problem. 
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cannot be addressed by a system where each country pursues environmental measures on 
its own.   Multilateral negotiations, agreements, and institutions are required.  
Furthermore, the point is not simply that global regulatory measures are needed to 
combat the effects of economic globalization.   If countries had industrialized in isolation, 
without any international trade or investment among them, they would still be emitting 
greenhouse gases, and we would still need a globally coordinated response. 
  Multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), even if they involve trade-
restricting measures, are viewed more favorably under the international rules than 
unilateral environmental measures.   Leaving aside the Law of the Sea, the Basel 
Convention on Hazardous Wastes, and a large number of relatively more minor 
agreements, three MEAs merit particular mention. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) was 
negotiated in 1973.    Although it lacks the teeth that many would like, it was notable as a 
precedent establishing that MEAs are compatible with the GATT even if they restrict 
trade.   An interesting issue relevant for species protection is whether a plan of using 
animals to support the economic livelihood of local residents can be a more sustainable 
form of protection than attempts to leave them untouched altogether.    
  The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is the most 
successful example of an MEA, as it has resulted in the phasing out of most use of CFCs  
(Chlorofluorocarbons) and other ozone-depleting chemicals.   The success of this 
agreement is partly attributable to the enforcement role played by trade sanctions: the 
protocol prohibits trade in controlled substances with countries that do not participate.   
This created the necessary incentive to push those developing countries that otherwise 
might have been reluctant into joining.  If substantial numbers of countries had 
nevertheless remained outside the Protocol, the trade sanctions would have also 
accomplished the second objective -- minimizing leakage, that is, the migration of 
production of banned substances to non-participating countries. 
42   The Protocol was 
helped to succeed in that there were a relatively small number of producers.  It also 
helped that there turned out to be good substitutes for the banned substances, though that 
was not known until the ban was tried.
43   The Protocol also worked to bolster the 
principle that PPMs were not necessarily incompatible with the GATT, in that the 
agreement threatened non-participants not only with a ban on trade in ozone-depleting 
chemicals themselves, but also a potential ban on trade in goods manufactured with such 
chemicals. 
The Kyoto Protocol on Global Climate Change, negotiated in 1997, is the most 
ambitious attempt at a multilateral environment agreement to date.  This is not the place 
to discuss the Kyoto Protocol at length.  The task of addressing Climate Change while 
satisfying the political constraints of the various factions (particularly, the US, EU, and 
developing countries) was an inherently impossible task.  Most economists emphasize 
that the agreement as it was written at Kyoto would impose large economic costs on the 
United States and other countries, while making only a minor dent in the problem.   The 
Clinton Administration’s interpretation of the Protocol insisted on so-called flexibility 
                                                 
42 Brack (1996). 
 
43 Parson (2002). 
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mechanisms, such as international trading of emission permits, to bring the economic 
costs down to a modest range.
44   This interpretation was rejected by the Europeans at the 
Hague in November 2000.    Without the flexibility mechanisms, the United States would  
be out of the Protocol, even if the subsequent administration had been a more 
environmentally friendly than it was.  (Ironically, now that European and other countries 
are trying to go ahead without the United States, they are finding that they cannot manage 
without such trading mechanisms.)     
Even most of those who for one reason or another do not believe that Kyoto was a 
useful step, however, must acknowledge that multilateral agreements will be necessary if 
the problem of Global Climate Change is to be tackled.  The current US Administration 
has yet to face up to this.  The point for present purposes is that a system in which each 
country insists, based on an appeal to national sovereignty, that it be left to formulate 
environmental policies on its own, would be a world in which global externalities like 
greenhouse gas emissions would not be effectively addressed. 
 
Summary of Conclusions 
 
  The relationship between globalization and the environment is too complex to 
sum up in a single judgment -- whether “good” or “bad.”  In many respects, global trade 
and investment operate like other sources of economic growth.   They tend to raise 
income as measured in the marketplace.  On the one hand, the higher scale of output can 
mean more pollution, deforestation, and other kinds of environmental damage.    On the 
other hand, changes in the composition and techniques of economic activity can lower the 
damage relative to income.   Although it is not possible to generalize universally about 
the net effect of these channels, it is possible to put forward general answers to some 
major relevant questions. 
 
•  A key question is whether openness to international trade undermines national 
attempts at environmental regulation, through a “race to the bottom” effect.   This no 
doubt happens sometimes.   But there is little statistical evidence, across countries, 
that the unfavorable effects on average outweigh favorable “gains from trade” effects 
on measures of pollution, such as SO2 concentrations.   If anything, the answer seems 
to be that favorable effects dominate. 
 
                                                 
44 The author was one of the few economists sympathetic to the Clinton Administration policy on 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Two claims:   (1) Quantitative targets a la Kyoto are the “least impossible” 
way politically to structure an international agreement (see Frankel, 2003, for my response to the 
arguments of Cooper, 1998, Nordhaus ,2001, and Schelling, 2002, against assignment of 
quantitative targets).    And  (2) Bill Clinton’s approach -- signing the treaty but announcing his 
intention not to submit for ratification unless the Europeans agreed to unrestricted international 
trading of emission permits and unless developing countries agreed to participate in the system -- 
was the least impossible way, subject to the existing political constraints, of demonstrating US 
willingness to address climate change.  It was our hope that when the world is ready to make a 
more serious attempt, it will build on the good aspects of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly the role 
for international permit trading and other flexibility mechanisms.   
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•  Perceptions that WTO panel rulings have interfered with the ability of individual 
countries to pursue environmental goals are poorly informed.  In cases such as 
Canadian asbestos, Venezuelan gasoline, and Asian shrimp, the rulings have 
confirmed that countries can enact environmental measures, even if they affect trade 
and even if they concern others’ Processes and Production Methods (PPMs), provided 
the measures do not unnecessarily discriminate among producer countries. 
 
•  People care both about the environment and the economy.  As their real income rises, 
their demand for environmental quality rises.  Under the right conditions, this can 
translate into environmental progress.    The right conditions include democracy, 
effective regulation, and externalities that are largely confined within national borders 
and are therefore amenable to national regulation. 
 
•  Increasingly, however, environmental problems do in fact spill across national 
borders.   The strongest examples are pure global externalities such as global climate 
change and ozone depletion.   Economic growth alone will not address such 
problems, in a system where each country acts individually, due to the free rider 
problem.  International institutions are required.   This would be equally true in the 
absence of international trade.   
 
•  Indeed, trade offers a handle whereby citizens of one country can exercise a role in 
environmental problems of other countries that they would otherwise not have.   
Consumer labeling campaigns and corporate codes of conduct are examples. 
 
•  Many aspects of the environment that might have been considered purely domestic 
matters in the past, or that foreign residents might not even have known about, are 
increasingly of concern to those living in other countries.  It again follows that if the 
issues are to be addressed, then multilateral institutions are the vehicle, and 
expressions of national sovereignty are the obstacle, not the other way around.    
Indeed, if one broadens the definition of globalization, beyond international trade and 
investment, to include the globalization of ideas and of NGO activities, then one can 
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